Internet and telecommunications experts, here on Friday to discuss homeland security, said increasingly complex software operating systems and networks have made it easier than ever to disrupt U.S. communications systems. At the same time, hackers don't need to be highly . . . . Internet and telecommunications experts, here on Friday to discuss homeland security, said increasingly complex software operating systems and networks have made it easier than ever to disrupt U.S. communications systems. At the same time, hackers don't need to be highly skilled to wreak havoc. "Over time, we're getting very sophisticated attacks from morons," said Bill Hancock, chair of the cybersecurity focus group of the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, which coordinates voluntary "best practices" to maintain a streamlined communications infrastructure. NRIC members include Sprint PCS, AOL Time Warner, Verisign and WorldCom, among others. In January, the FCC chartered NRIC to recommend ways for companies to thwart cyberattacks post-Sept. 11. On Friday, NRIC issued its initial recommendations, several of them culled from existing industry best practices that companies are already supposed to follow -- but often don't. The link for this article located at Wired is no longer available. . Internet and telecommunications experts, here on Friday to discuss homeland security, said increasin. internet, telecommunications, experts, friday, discuss, homeland, security, increasin. . Anthony Pell
Bruce Schneier's comments on a security Underwriters Laboratory. As always, a well-thought-out commentary well worth reading. " Second, network security is much too hard to test. Again, safes are easy. Breaking into them requires skill but is reasonably straightforward. Modern software . . . . Bruce Schneier's comments on a security Underwriters Laboratory. As always, a well-thought-out commentary well worth reading. " Second, network security is much too hard to test. Again, safes are easy. Breaking into them requires skill but is reasonably straightforward. Modern software is obscenely complex: There's an enormous number of features, configurations, implementations. And then there are interactions between different products, different vendors, and different networks. In the past, I've written extensively about complexity and the impossibility of testing security. For now, suffice it to say that testing any reasonably sized software product would cost millions of dollars and wouldn't guarantee anything at the end. And worse, if you updated the product you'd have to test it all over again." The link for this article located at ZDNet is no longer available. . Delving into Bruce Schneier's perspectives on the obstacles faced in evaluating network defense mechanisms and the intricacies of software systems.. Cybersecurity Risks, Network Security Testing, Software Assessment. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
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