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    Mageia 2020-0465: compat-openssl10 security update

    Date 21 Dec 2020
    444
    Posted By LinuxSecurity Advisories
    The Raccoon attack exploits a flaw in the TLS specification which can lead to an attacker being able to compute the pre-master secret in connections which have used a Diffie-Hellman (DH) based ciphersuite. In such a case this would result in the attacker being able to eavesdrop on all encrypted communications sent over that TLS connection. The attack can only be exploited
    MGASA-2020-0465 - Updated compat-openssl10 packages fix security vulnerabilities
    
    Publication date: 21 Dec 2020
    URL: https://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2020-0465.html
    Type: security
    Affected Mageia releases: 7
    CVE: CVE-2020-1968,
         CVE-2020-1971
    
    The Raccoon attack exploits a flaw in the TLS specification which can lead
    to an attacker being able to compute the pre-master secret in connections
    which have used a Diffie-Hellman (DH) based ciphersuite. In such a case this
    would result in the attacker being able to eavesdrop on all encrypted
    communications sent over that TLS connection. The attack can only be exploited
    if an implementation re-uses a DH secret across multiple TLS connections.
    Note that this issue only impacts DH ciphersuites and not ECDH ciphersuites.
    (CVE-2020-1968)
    
    The X.509 GeneralName type is a generic type for representing different types
    of names. One of those name types is known as EDIPartyName.
    OpenSSL provides a function GENERAL_NAME_cmp which compares different
    instances of a GENERAL_NAME to see if they are equal or not. This function
    behaves incorrectly when both GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME.
    A NULL pointer dereference and a crash may occur leading to a possible
    denial of service attack. OpenSSL itself uses the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function
    for two purposes:
    1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a
    CRL distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate
    2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the
    timestamp authority name (exposed via the API functions TS_RESP_verify_response
    and TS_RESP_verify_token)
    If an attacker can control both items being compared then that attacker
    could trigger a crash. For example if the attacker can trick a client or
    server into checking a malicious certificate against a malicious CRL then
    this may occur.
    Note that some applications automatically download CRLs based on a URL
    embedded in a certificate. This checking happens prior to the signatures on
    the certificate and CRL being verified. OpenSSL's s_server, s_client and
    verify tools have support for the "-crl_download" option which implements
    automatic CRL downloading and this attack has been demonstrated to work
    against those tools. Note that an unrelated bug means that affected versions
    of OpenSSL cannot parse or construct correct encodings of EDIPARTYNAME.
    However it is possible to construct a malformed EDIPARTYNAME that OpenSSL's
    parser will accept and hence trigger this attack.
    (CVE-2020-1971)
    
    References:
    - https://bugs.mageia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27305
    - https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200909.txt
    - https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4504-1
    - https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20201208.txt
    - https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4807
    - https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4662-1
    - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-1968
    - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-1971
    
    SRPMS:
    - 7/core/compat-openssl10-1.0.2u-1.1.mga7
    

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