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OpenSUSE: 2022:005 High: Remote Code Execution Through SSH

Attackers may trick "sudo" to log failed sudo invocations executing the sendmail program with root-privileges and not completely cleaned environment.. ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: sudo Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2002:002 Date: Mon Jan 14 13:00:00 CET 2002 Affected SuSE versions: 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 Vulnerability Type: local privilege escalation Severity (1-10): 5 SuSE default package: yes Other affected systems: all recent sudo installations Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: Sendmail invocation as root. problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information The SuSE Security Team discovered a bug in the sudo program which is installed setuid to root. Attackers may trick "sudo" to log failed sudo invocations executing the sendmail program with root-privileges and not completely cleaned environment. Depending on the installed mail-package this may enable attackers to execute code as root. This is the case for at least the postfix mailer. Other mailers may be exploited in a similar way. This bug has been fixed by having "sudo" invoke the sendmail command with user-privileges instead. Please update your sudo package regardless of the mail-packages you are using. As a temporary workaround you may remove the s-bit from sudo with the "chmod -s `which sudo`" command, which will disable the sudo functionality. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methodslisted in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. i386 Intel Platform: SuSE-7.3 b98f00f761274530bfad3486253bed53 source rpm: d046509163e1fc6d4143a8db1c2283d2 SuSE-7.2 ee01b7b2ba2e73376eb3c358ccb5b768 source rpm: e8cbaa81d9a806169f0c235ed6bc5d6a SuSE-7.1 7ba4ae9fb72348e0d1909c9ea79be5e0 source rpm: a10b4ecae46aaff271f59c7dd726d8d0 SuSE-7.0 345a8e541b66d5016b939560a525d47c source rpm: 58afdb9b1e6c9e19440ee4047fff1105 Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3 94139dd96c9be67d4e41d38abee95434 source rpm: b5f16c705cdcf85754037296b8847b20 SuSE-7.1 915313678145418569c54332760f989a source rpm: 2fd809a5f53992aa23c732d9466e274a SuSE-7.0 0c1dce308b37b31ea943369ba23e3dab source rpm: da4786d3e8798e6c31d4eea338e9cd93 AXP Alpha Platform: SuSE-7.1 eb020b7e212e0d9cb85578a1b49e3529 source rpm: fb2652e480282dfecbbb7e6db8ec7bec SuSE-7.0 35b6ea7ebac976d8b65f9f09b574e107 source rpm: 0ac6c3001d727f3774a57cc76eb7d4c1 Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3 3ff70447a81e3f4c88b44af2445d4f6d source rpm: f71b62019ea2f49e0202f74033f07496 SuSE-7.1 3bef306a5a8b782fdda0bdd77758b290 source rpm: d9475c12754ae3c87cac72484dc90bbc SuSE-7.0 54d98aa831bab75529731d0789f01cbd source rpm: c61d3c629eefaf0eb041a630414d6580 ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - stunnel A format string error in the stunnel ssl wrapper was reported on bugtraq in December 2001. SuSE Linux 7.2 and 7.3 as well as SLES7 contain the stunnel package in Version3.14, which should be vulnerable to the format string bug according to the reports on bugtraq. However, the responsible portion of code does not expose the format string problem with calls to fdprintf(). Therefore, SuSE stunnel packages are not vulnerable to the security problem. - thttpd The thttpd daemon contained several off-by-one overflows. Due to internal organization of the variables affected by these overflows, they seem not exploitable. However, these bugs have been fixed. Please update to the newest thttpd packages. - pine The popular mail client "pine" was found vulnerable to an attack where shell metacharacters inside an URL could be used to execute arbitrary commands if pine passes the URL to an external viewer on the commandline. The pine packages on SuSE products are not vulnerable to this weakness because they contain a patch that works around this problem since it is not new. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. ), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig to verify the signature of the package, where is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key " This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. " upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to . This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to . For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: or respectively. ==================================================================== SuSE's security contact is or . The public key is listed below. ====================================================================______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE GmbH makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see The GNU Privacy Guard mQENAzbhLQQAAAEIAKAkXHe0lWRBXLpn38hMHy03F0I4Sszmoc8aaKJrhfhyMlOA BqvklPLE2f9UrI4Xc860gH79ZREwAgPt0pi6+SleNFLNcNFAuuHMLQOOsaMFatbz JR9i4m/lf6q929YROu5zB48rBAlcfTm+IBbijaEdnqpwGib45wE/Cfy6FAttBHQh 1Kp+r/jPbf1mYAvljUfHKuvbg8t2EIQz/5yGp+n5trn9pElfQO2cRBq8LFpf1l+U P7EKjFmlOq+Gs/fF98/dP3DfniSd78LQPq5vp8RL8nr/o2i7jkAQ33m4f1wOBWd+ cZovrKXYlXiR+Bf7m2hpZo+/sAzhd7LmAD0l09kABRG0JVN1U0UgU2VjdXJpdHkg VGVhbSA8c2VjdXJpdHlAc3VzZS5kZT6JARUDBRA24S1H5Fiyh7HKPEUBAVcOB/9b yHYji1/+4Xc2GhvXK0FSJN0MGgeXgW47yxDL7gmR4mNgjlIOUHZj0PEpVjWepOJ7 tQS3L9oP6cpj1Fj/XxuLbkp5VCQ61hpt54coQAvYrnT9rtWEGN+xmwejT1WmYmDJ xG+EGBXKr+XP69oIUl1E2JO3rXeklulgjqRKos4cdXKgyjWZ7CP9V9daRXDtje63 Om8gwSdU/nCvhdRIWp/Vwbf7Ia8iZr9OJ5YuQl0DBG4qmGDDrvImgPAFkYFzwlqo choXFQ9y0YVCV41DnR+GYhwl2qBd81T8aXhihEGPIgaw3g8gd8B5o6mPVgl+nJqI BkEYGBusiag2pS6qwznZiQEVAwUQNuEtBHey5gA9JdPZAQFtOAf+KVh939b0J94u v/kpg4xs1LthlhquhbHcKNoVTNspugiC3qMPyvSX4XcBr2PC0cVkS4Z9PY9iCfT+ x9WM96g39dAF+le2CCx7XISk9XXJ4ApEy5g4AuK7NYgAJd39PPbERgWnxjxir9g0 Ix30dS30bW39D+3NPU5Ho9TD/B7UDFvYT5AWHl3MGwo3a1RhTs6sfgL7yQ3U+mvq MkTExZb5mfN1FeaYKMopoI4VpzNVeGxQWIz67VjJHVyUlF20ekOz4kWVgsxkc8G2 saqZd6yv2EwqYTi8BDAduweP33KrQc4KDDommQNDOXxaKOeCoESIdM4p7Esdjq1o L0oixF12CohGBBARAgAGBQI7HmHDAAoJEJ5A4xAACqukTlQAoI4QzP9yjPohY7OU F7J3eKBTzp25AJ42BmtSd3pvm5ldmognWF3Trhp+GYkAlQMFEDe3O8IWkDf+zvyS FQEBAfkD/3GG5UgJj18UhYmh1gfjIlDcPAeqMwSytEHDENmHC+vlZQ/p0mT9tPiW tp34io54mwr+bLPN8l6B5GJNkbGvH6M+mO7R8Lj4nHL6pyAv3PQr83WyLHcaX7It Klj371/4yzKV6qpz43SGRK4MacLo2rNZ/dNej7lwPCtzCcFYwqkiiEYEEBECAAYF AjoaQqQACgkQx1KqMrDf94ArewCfWnTUDG5gNYkmHG4bYL8fQcizyA4An2eVo/n+ 3J2KRWSOhpAMsnMxtPbBmQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCk YS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP +Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0dM+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR 8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcOQliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U 8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrKXBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0S cZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBED3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEh ELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUdG5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtB UVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NMCC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOo AqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoEmyW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1n KFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNrYWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohc BBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkDwmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8s AJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6dNfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQ EQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCeQOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACe OO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNeLZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vf iUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3tXXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEI SZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBUD9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9g TPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ30kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23p QUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1y PqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpWcRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IX SzyohEJB6XG5+D0BuQINBDnu9JIQCACEkdBN6Mxf5WvqDWkcMRy6wnrd9DYJ8UUT mIT2iQf07tRUKJJ9v0JXfx2Z4d08IQSMNRaq4VgSe+PdYgIy0fbj23Via5/gO7fJ EpD2hd2f+pMnOWvH2rOOIbeYfuhzAc6BQjAKtmgR0ERUTafTM9Wb6F13CNZZNZfD qnFDP6L12w3z3F7FFXkz07Rs3AIto1ZfYZd4sCSpMr/0S5nLrHbIvGLp271hhQBe RmmoGEKO2JRelGgUJ2CUzOdtwDIKT0LbCpvaP8PVnYF5IFoYJIWRHqlEt5ucTXst Zy7vYjL6vTP4l5xs+LIOkNmPhqmfsgLzVo0UaLt80hOwc4NvDCOLAAMGB/9g+9V3 ORzw4LvO1pwRYJqfDKUq/EJ0rNMMD4N8RLpZRhKHKJUm9nNHLbksnlZwrbSTM5Lp C/U6sheLP+l0bLVoq0lmsCcUSyh+mY6PxWirLIWCn/IAZAGnXb6Zd6TtIJlGG6pq UN8QxGJYQnonl0uTJKHJENbI9sWHQdcTtBMc34gorHFCo1Bcvpnc1LFLrWn7mfoG x6INQjf3HGQpMXAWuSBQhzkazY6vaWFpa8bBJ+gKbBuySWzNm3rFtT5HRKMWpO+M 9bHp4d+puY0L1YwN1OMatcMMpcWnZpiWiR83oi32+xtWUY2U7Ae38mMag8zFbpeq PQUsDv9V7CAJ1dbriEwEGBECAAwFAjnu9JIFCQPCZwAACgkQqE7a6JyACspLIgCb BQd/++0pB9yZWDhqxHtTpdCXRsAAnik7bYHlTxQfohiXYsEJcWrDn7l8 =ojbD -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- . Remote code execution risk due to sudo misconfiguration; immediate update required for openSUSE users.. SuSE Security,Sudo Privileges,Local Escalation,Sendmail Exploit. . Severity: Critical. LinuxSecurity.com Team

Calendar%202 Jan 14, 2002 Critical SuSE
98

Red Hat 6.x: RHSA-2000:002-01 Critical: Lpr Access Control Threat

New lpr packages are available to fix two security problems in lpd.. ` --------------------------------------------------------------------- Red Hat, Inc. Security Advisory Synopsis: New lpr packages available Advisory ID: RHSA-2000:002-01 Issue date: 2000-01-07 Updated on: 2000-01-07 Keywords: lpr lpd DNS sendmail Cross references: --------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Topic: New lpr packages are available to fix two security problems in lpd. 2. Relevant releases/architectures: Red Hat Linux 4.x, all architectures Red Hat Linux 5.x, all architectures Red Hat Linux 6.x, all architectures 3. Problem description: Two security vulnerabilities exist in the lpd (line printer daemon) shipped with the lpr package. First, authentication was not thorough enough. If a remote user was able to control their own DNS so that their IP address resolved to the hostname of the print server, access would be granted, when it should not be. Secondly, it was possible in the control file of a print job to specify arguments to sendmail. By careful manipulation of control and data files, this could cause sendmail to be executed with a user-specified configuration file. This could lead very easily to a root compromise. It is recommended that all users of Red Hat Linux using the lpr package (which is required to print) upgrade to the fixed packages. Thanks go to DilDog (This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.) for noting the vulnerability. 4. Solution: For each RPM for your particular architecture, run: rpm -Fvh where filename is the name of the RPM. 5. Bug IDs fixed ( for more info): 6. Obsoleted by: 7. Conflicts with: 8. RPMs required: Red Hat Linux 6.x: Intel: Alpha: Sparc: Source packages: Red Hat Linux 5.x: Intel: Alpha: Sparc: Source packages: Red Hat Linux 4.x: Intel: Alpha: Sparc: Source packages: 9. Verification: MD5 sum PackageName -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 78f2220331189e723eab944b53d0710e i386/lpr-0.48-1.i386.rpm 3fcb89eb1a76741a505d3eeeddfa3674 alpha/lpr-0.48-1.alpha.rpm 441cfee04428ca215d98d9ce3d20bc4d sparc/lpr-0.48-1.sparc.rpm 55c6a740b03569919ec08992257cad96 SRPMS/lpr-0.48-1.src.rpm 25ba4d2b49ff42403062d44f52f59947 i386/lpr-0.48-0.5.2.i386.rpm aa13284c581601705fef727565ed407e alpha/lpr-0.48-0.5.2.alpha.rpm 8d158ba104fadbfc84b5122f9564b2ed sparc/lpr-0.48-0.5.2.sparc.rpm 3d7a10a086f5bd5aea739ec41d761881 SRPMS/lpr-0.48-0.5.2.src.rpm a215955554df002e91e336abd310e3f1 i386/lpr-0.48-0.4.2.i386.rpm a96363769e3815a5a5bb40084d8fac61 alpha/lpr-0.48-0.4.2.alpha.rpm f56271b462851990238a24a5357c454f sparc/lpr-0.48-0.4.2.sparc.rpm 48453e0c888e3d124a6b50fbb9a89be9 SRPMS/lpr-0.48-0.4.2.src.rpm These packages are GPG signed by Red Hat, Inc. for security. Our key is available at: You can verify each package with the following command: rpm --checksig If you only wish to verify that each package has not been corrupted or tampered with, examine only the md5sum with the following command: rpm --checksig --nogpg 10. References: `. New lpr enhancements have been released by Red Hat to address critical security flaws identified in the line printer daemon lpd.. Red Hat Linux,lpr package,security issues,line printer daemon,authentication flaw. . Severity: Critical. LinuxSecurity.com Team

Calendar%202 Jan 11, 2000 Critical Red Hat
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[{"id":506,"title":"Yes \u2014 critical security patches should install automatically.","votes":0,"type":"x","order":1,"pct":0,"resources":[]},{"id":507,"title":"No \u2014 every update should be tested before deployment.","votes":0,"type":"x","order":2,"pct":0,"resources":[]},{"id":508,"title":"Only critical vulnerabilities should auto-install.","votes":0,"type":"x","order":3,"pct":0,"resources":[]},{"id":509,"title":"I patch when Reddit starts panicking.","votes":1,"type":"x","order":4,"pct":100,"resources":[]}] ["#ff5b00","#4ac0f2","#b80028","#eef66c","#60bb22","#b96a9a","#62c2cc"] ["rgba(255,91,0,0.7)","rgba(74,192,242,0.7)","rgba(184,0,40,0.7)","rgba(238,246,108,0.7)","rgba(96,187,34,0.7)","rgba(185,106,154,0.7)","rgba(98,194,204,0.7)"] 350
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