In this issue, Bruce Schneier talks about, the "Security Patch Treadmill", the future role of insurance in network security, Harvards "new" and "uncrackable" cryptosystem, the TCP/IP sequence number bug, the "closed' cryptosystem of iBallot.com, some problems with conventional IDS, and how . . .
In this issue, Bruce Schneier talks about, the "Security Patch Treadmill", the future role of insurance in network security, Harvards "new" and "uncrackable" cryptosystem, the TCP/IP sequence number bug, the "closed' cryptosystem of iBallot.com, some problems with conventional IDS, and how the recent vulnerabilities found in the 802.11 WEP protocol should make us all take another look at all protocols: "I see a more general story: "There are problems in lots of protocols, we find and fix them randomly, and this doesn't bode well for the future of security."

The link for this article located at Bruce Schneier is no longer available.