Ever wonder what happens to a piece of software when the people who wrote it just stop showing up? In the industry, we call this the bus factor. It is a morbid name for a very simple metric. It measures how many key developers would have to be hit by a bus before a project becomes unmaintained. If that number is one or two, you are looking at a single point of failure.
I spent some time looking at the March 2026 data from the JetBrains Bus Factor Explorer. The results for Linux systems and database stability are a bit of a wake-up call. We tend to view open source as a massive, self-healing collective. We assume that if a project is popular, there must be a thousand people who know how it works. The data suggests otherwise.
When you look at the current rankings, a clear divide emerges. MongoDB currently has a bus factor of 7. MariaDB and Redis both sit at 5. In the world of open source sustainability, 5 is generally considered the threshold for a healthy project. It means the knowledge is spread out enough that the project can survive a few departures.
Then you look at the pillars of the Linux ecosystem. MySQL, PostgreSQL, and SQLite all have a bus factor of 2. This is what we call a low or high-risk state. It means that for these massive, global projects, only two people are central to maintaining the core architecture well enough to fix it when it breaks.
|
Database |
Bus Factor (2026) |
Risk Category |
Key Impact |
|
MongoDB |
7 |
OK |
High knowledge distribution |
|
MariaDB |
5 |
OK |
Resilient community model |
|
Redis |
5 |
OK |
Strong functional redundancy |
|
MySQL |
2 |
Low |
Knowledge is heavily siloed |
|
PostgreSQL |
2 |
Low |
High technical complexity in few hands |
|
SQLite |
2 |
Low |
Massive global dependency on a tiny core |
It is easy to think that a fork would just solve the problem. If the main devs leave, someone else will just pick up the code. But code is not just text. It is context. Simulations were run to see what happens to the functional parts of the code when the top two contributors are removed from the equation.
For MySQL and SQLite, the result was a 100% loss of functional directories. This includes the storage engines and the SQL parsers. In PostgreSQL, the loss was 83.3%. The code does not disappear, but it becomes a black box. No one left in the room understands the "why" behind the logic. This is how technical debt turns into a security liability. When a new vulnerability is found in one of those "lost" directories, the patch won't come quickly.
A "lost" directory is code that exists but cannot be safely evolved. If the developers who understand the memory allocation in a database leave, the remaining team might be afraid to touch it. This leads to several issues:
This is not just a theoretical worry about productivity. It is a documented security threat. We saw this play out with the XZ Utils backdoor. That project had a bus factor of one. A single, overwhelmed maintainer was running the show. According to the OpenSSF and OpenJS Joint Alert, a state-sponsored actor spent two years building a relationship with that maintainer. They offered help and slowly gained trust.
They didn't hack the software with a script. They hacked the bus factor. They filled a vacuum of knowledge and used it to insert a backdoor that almost compromised every Linux server on the planet. When a project has a low bus factor,it creates opportunities for abuse. Attackers look for these lonely projects because they are the easiest to subvert.
There is an interesting comparison between MySQL and MariaDB. They share the same history, but their human structures have diverged. In the same simulation where MySQL lost 100% of its knowledge base, MariaDB only lost 16.7%. MariaDB has a bus factor of 5.
This tells us that community governance is a physical security feature. By distributing knowledge across more people, MariaDB has built a project that is harder to kill and harder to subvert. It shows that you can choose resilience if you prioritize contributor density over just shipping features.
If you are responsible for a Linux environment, you have to start looking at your supply chain through this lens. The CISA Open Source Software Security Roadmap emphasizes this kind of radical transparency. They want us to stop looking at just the license and start looking at the sustainability of the people.
You can use the CHAOSS metrics to audit your own dependencies. These metrics help identify which critical FOSS packages are most at risk. Here is what you should look for when choosing a new tool or auditing an old one:
We spend a lot of money on firewalls to keep people out. We should probably spend a little more time making sure the people inside the projects are actually there to stay. Security is not just about the code. It is about the bench of people standing behind it. Check your bus factor before the bus checks you.
What actually breaks on your Linux server if the top two developers leave? Here is the "lost knowledge" map.