Which is more important in a network: the client machines or the system infrastructure? This could be debated until the cows come home and further debated to include the cows. Personally I would say the latter, but as we have seen this week, one single client machines can open up an almighty can of whoop-ass on the entire network.. One could debate whether it was the update server administrator who was at fault (they were, by the way) as opposed to the machine running Vista, which Microsoft had issued a patch and security advisory for months before. While you, the readers, jumped on the anti-Microsoft bandwagon, I still maintain it was down to the fault of the one individual and not the operating system. With recent events, along with past and future issues each institution has to face, how do they get the balance right between allowing academic freedom, yet maintaining security of the work produced? Can they provide an open and secure learning environment without diminishing access or availability? There are a few things to take into account. The link for this article located at ZDNet is no longer available. . Navigating the intersection of scholarly independence and cybersecurity protocols in higher education institutions.. University Network Security, Client Machine Risks, Academic Environment Security, System Infrastructure Safety. . Alex
The deployment and maintenance of these technologies does take time and in some cases specialized knowledge, resulting in higher costs. Whether or not this price is worth paying depends on one factor: how much damage would a serious intrusion into the internal network cost your organization? . . .. Since at least 1998 (see Avolio), security experts have warned that a perimeter defence alone is insufficient, and the vast majority of networks are extremely vulnerable as soon as the firewall, proxy service or physical security layer at said perimeter has been breached. The situation today has not changed much since 1998. Most security initiatives still concentrate on the firewalls and other border devices, and virus defence is the only area where a low level of penetration has been achieved in securing each individual client. None of this is news, though the extent of the danger is beginning to surface slowly, as more and more security experts point to the problem. Nevertheless, I believe strongly that the threat is still being underestimated, even by those who condemn perimeter defences. I have recently pointed out in [Vogt] that even a large corporate network can be destroyed in minutes, once an entry point has been gained and malicious code of sufficient quality has been brought inside. [Hanson] elaborated and strengthened this point using past worms as the example. The entire point of this analysis is that any breach of the perimeter is potentially fatal, no matter how small it is, if the interior network is soft. In my paper, a single compromised machine brought down 98% of a class B network in less than a minute. I know of no current or under-development defence systems that could defend against this kind of attack. Most importantly, as the worm is saturating the network, any kind of central defence mechanism will be slowed down by the very attack it should be fighting. The entire scenario is a typical one-vs-many problem. A centralized defence against a clever worm optimized for private networks will simplybe overwhelmed by the sheer number of attackers, which are multiplying at dazzling speed. As with any disease, stopping it early is the only realistic defence. Immunization of the potential victim is the most reliable. The link for this article located at SecurityFocus is no longer available. . Cybersecurity analysts argue that relying solely on external defenses is inadequate; uncover internal system weaknesses and potential exploitation techniques.. Network Security, Perimeter Defense, Attack Methods, Internal Threats. . Anthony Pell
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