Tuesday morning, as millions of Americans lined up at their polling places to participate in the often quite literally broken democratic process, a new Twitter account tweeted a link to a short manifesto: “today’s voting machines are often insecure, not particularly easy-to-use, and so expensive that they’re often used much longer than they were designed for and election officials are forced to hunt for replacement parts on eBay. The market has failed us.”. The announcement, from a new nonprofit called VotingWorks, ended with a promise to build a “secure, affordable, open-source voting machine” from the ground up. The letter wasn’t signed, but it’s the work of Ben Adida, a software developer who has studied voting machines for more than 20 years and had a PhD from MIT in secure voting. The link for this article located at Motherboard is no longer available. . A recent initiative, VoteTech, seeks to develop an innovative, cost-effective open-source electoral platform to supplant aging voting systems.. Open Source Voting Machines, Secure Voting Systems, Election Technology. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
The U.S. federal agency in charge of government technology standards approved on Thursday the accreditation of two laboratories to perform certification of election computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommended that iBeta Quality Assurance and SysTest Labs be allowed to test election equipment under the current guidelines, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) said on Thursday. If the EAC approves the recommendations, the two companies will be the first to receive credentials under the new Voting System Certification and Laboratory Accreditation Program. . "EAC's Voting System Certification and Laboratory Accreditation Program represents the first time the federal government will accredit test laboratories and certify voting equipment," the EAC stated in a press release on Thursday. "In the past, these functions were performed on a volunteer basis by the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), which did not receive any federal funds." The security and reliability of electronic voting systems continues to worry many election experts and security researchers. During the 2006 midterm elections, a combination of ballot problems and the lack, on e-voting machines, of an obvious warning for voters who failed to vote in a race led to massive undervoting in Sarasota County, Florida, and likely gave the election to Vern Buchanan, a Republican representative. The current accreditation program uses the 2002 Voting System Standards and the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. The latest guidelines--dubbed the 2007 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines-- will likely include a requirement that a software independent audit trail be implemented by voting machines. Those guidelines will not be considered by the EAC until July 2007. NIST made the recommendations in a letter sent to the EAC on Thursday. Four other companies--including InfoGuard Laboratories, BKP Security Labs, Wyle Laboratories and Ciber Labs--have not received a recommendation fromNIST. As reported earlier this month, Ciber Labs lost its accreditation after failing to follow quality-control guidelines. The link for this article located at Security Focus is no longer available. . 'EAC's Voting System Certification and Laboratory Accreditation Program represents the first time th. federal, agency, charge, government, technology, standards, approved, thursday, accred. . Brittany Day
As the nation's election officials struggle with problematic electronic voting machines, a new ballot-marking system initially designed for disabled voters could help solve a crucial problem--the lack of an auditable paper trail. . . .. Unveiled Wednesday by Vogue Election Products and Services, the AutoMARK ballot-marking system features touch-screen voting that operates in tandem with optical scanners. "We're actually getting a lot of interest to use the AutoMARK for all voters and not just for disabled people," said sales manager Rob Resuali in an interview. The system has been perfected in the firm's research unit, but it won't be ready in time for use in the November national elections. Resuali said the AutoMARK will be tested in the field in November in Maricopa County, Arizona, where it will run in parallel with existing election equipment. The AutoMARK has also been successfully tested by the Michigan Commission for The Blind, he added. Resuali said the AutoMARK terminal has been designed to meet the requirements established by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002. The legislation was established after the voting fiascoes of the 2000 election. Since then, voting-machine manufacturers have struggled to perfect voting machines and bring them up to meet the HAVE requirements. One particularly onerous and heretofore unsolvable problem has been the inability of most voting machines to provide for reliable audit trails, required in elections when recounts are called for. The link for this article located at W. David Gardner is no longer available. . Unveiled Wednesday by Vogue Election Products and Services, the AutoMARK ballot-marking system featu. nation's, election, officials, struggle, problematic, electronic, voting, machines, ballo. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
If election officials want to convince voters that electronic voting can be trusted, they should be willing to make it at least as secure as slot machines. To appreciate how poor the oversight on voting systems is, it's useful to look at the way Nevada systematically ensures that electronic gambling machines in Las Vegas operate honestly and accurately. Electronic voting, by comparison, is rife with lax procedures, security risks and conflicts of interest. . . .. If election officials want to convince voters that electronic voting can be trusted, they should be willing to make it at least as secure as slot machines. To appreciate how poor the oversight on voting systems is, it's useful to look at the way Nevada systematically ensures that electronic gambling machines in Las Vegas operate honestly and accurately. Electronic voting, by comparison, is rife with lax procedures, security risks and conflicts of interest. On a trip last week to the Nevada Gaming Control Board laboratory, in a state office building off the Las Vegas Strip, we found testing and enforcement mechanisms that go far beyond what is required for electronic voting. Among the ways gamblers are more protected than voters: 1. The state has access to all gambling software. The Gaming Control Board has copies on file of every piece of gambling device software currently being used, and an archive going back years. It is illegal for casinos to use software not on file. Electronic voting machine makers, by contrast, say their software is a trade secret, and have resisted sharing it with the states that buy their machines. 2. The software on gambling machines is constantly being spot-checked. . If election officials want to convince voters that electronic voting can be trusted, they should be . election, officials, convince, voters, electronic, voting, trusted, should. . Anthony Pell
Bruce Schneier speaks on anonymity and other issues involving the future of voting. "The goal of any voting system is to establish the intent of the voter, and transfer that intent to the vote counter. Amongst a circle of friends, a . . . . Bruce Schneier speaks on anonymity and other issues involving the future of voting. "The goal of any voting system is to establish the intent of the voter, and transfer that intent to the vote counter. Amongst a circle of friends, a show of hands can easily decide which movie to attend. The vote is open and everyone can monitor it. But what if Alice wants Charlie's Angels and Bob wants 102 Dalmatians? Will Alice vote in front of his friends? Will Bob? What if the circle of friends is two hundred; how long will it take to count the votes? Will the theater still be showing the movie? Because the scale changes, our voting methods have to change. Anonymity requires a secret ballot. Scaling and speed requirements lead to mechanical and computerized voting systems. The ideal voting technology would have these four attributes: anonymity, scalability, speed, audit, and accuracy--direct mapping from intent to counted vote." The link for this article located at Planet IT is no longer available. . In his analysis, Bruce Schneier explores the complexities surrounding electoral technology, emphasizing the need for both privacy and effective procedures in the democratic process.. Voting Technology, Election Process, Bruce Schneier, Anonymity in Voting. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
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