The OpenSSH development team has announced the release of version 5.9 of its open source SSH (Secure Shell) implementation. Compared to the OpenSSH 5.8 release from 7 months ago, which was primarily a security update, the latest update includes a wider variety of changes including the addition of new SHA256-based HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) transport integrity modes.. To prevent a compromised privsep (privilege separation) child from being used to attack other hosts, sandboxing has been introduced through an optional mode that enables mandatory restrictions on the system calls (syscalls) which the privsep child can perform. The developers note that the sandboxing of the privsep child process is "currently experimental but should become the default in a future release". The link for this article located at H Security is no longer available. . In OpenSSH 5.9, mitigating risks from a compromised privsep child is essential; using SHA256 checksums and enhanced sandboxing significantly improves security. OpenSSH, SHA256, Secure Shell, sandboxing, privilege separation. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
Douglas Kilpatrick sent in a note about a new open source project going on at Network Associates. "Privman is a library that makes it easy for programs to use privilege separation, a technique that prevents the leak or misuse of privilege from applications that must run with some elevated permissions. Applications that use the Privman library split into two halves, the half that performs valid privileged operations, and the half that contains the application's logic. The Privman library simplifies the otherwise complex task of separating the application, protecting the system from compromise if an error in the application logic is found.. . .. Douglas Kilpatrick sent in a note about a new open source project going on at Network Associates. "Privman is a library that makes it easy for programs to use privilege separation, a technique that prevents the leak or misuse of privilege from applications that must run with some elevated permissions. Applications that use the Privman library split into two halves, the half that performs valid privileged operations, and the half that contains the application's logic. The Privman library simplifies the otherwise complex task of separating the application, protecting the system from compromise if an error in the application logic is found. The library uses configuration files to provide fine-grained access control for the privileged operations, limiting exposure in even of an attack against the application. When the application is compromised, the attacker gains only the privileges of an unprivileged user and the specific privileges granted to the application by the application's Privman configuration file. Current Status The most recent version of Privman is 0.8.4. The Privman libraries should be considered developmental, and parts of the API are likely to change. We are interested in any feedback, bug fixes, or requests for functionality. We are particularly interested in features that make it easier to modify existing software to use the Privman library. ThePrivman API should be sufficient for most applications. We have successfully patched WU-FTPD to use Privman, as well as THTTPD. The link for this article located at NAI is no longer available. . Explore how Privman streamlines privilege isolation to bolster application safety and optimize access management.. Privman, Privilege Separation, Access Control, Open Source Project. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
OpenSSH 3.5 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.org/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol version 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement.. . .. OpenSSH 3.5 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.org/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol version 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. We would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support and encouragement. From: Markus Friedl To:
In an email addressed to many in the security community today, including LinuxSecurity, Theo de Raadt, lead developer for OpenBSD and OpenSSH, announced an OpenSSH vulnerability. The details of the vulnerability have not yet been made public, but has acknowledged that it is remotely exploitable. Included below are details on what Linux users can do to mitigate the risks until vendors release their updated versions.. . .. In an email addressed to many in the security community today, including LinuxSecurity, Theo de Raadt, lead developer for OpenBSD and OpenSSH, announced an OpenSSH vulnerability. The details of the vulnerability have not yet been made public, but has acknowledged that it is remotely exploitable. Included below are details on what Linux users can do to mitigate the risks until vendors release their updated versions. Subject: Upcoming OpenSSH vulnerability Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 15:00:10 -0600 From: Theo de Raadt There is an upcoming OpenSSH vulnerability that we're working on with ISS. Details will be published early next week. However, I can say that when OpenSSH's sshd(8) is running with priv seperation, the bug cannot be exploited. OpenSSH 3.3p was released a few days ago, with various improvements but in particular, it significantly improves the Linux and Solaris support for priv sep. However, it is not yet perfect. Compression is disabled on some systems, and the many varieties of PAM are causing major headaches. However, everyone should update to OpenSSH 3.3 immediately, and enable priv seperation in their ssh daemons, by setting this in your /etc/ssh/sshd_config file: UsePrivilegeSeparation yes Depending on what your system is, privsep may break some ssh functionality. However, with privsep turned on, you are immune from at least one remote hole. Understand? 3.3 does not contain a fix for this upcoming bug. If priv seperation does not work on your operating system, you need to work with your vendor so that we get patches to make it work on your system. Our developersare swamped enough without trying to support the myriad of PAM and other issues which exist in various systems. You must call on your vendors to help us. Basically, OpenSSH sshd(8) is something like 27000 lines of code. A lot of that runs as root. But when UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled, the daemon splits into two parts. A part containing about 2500 lines of code remains as root, and the rest of the code is shoved into a chroot-jail without any privs. This makes the daemon less vulnerable to attack. We've been trying to warn vendors about 3.3 and the need for privsep, but they really have not heeded our call for assistance. They have basically ignored us. Some, like Alan Cox, even went further stating that privsep was not being worked on because "Nobody provided any info which proves the problem, and many people dont trust you theo" and suggested I "might be feeding everyone a trojan" (I think I'll publish that letter -- it is just so funny). HP's representative was downright rude, but that is OK because Compaq is retiring him. Except for Solar Designer, I think none of them has helped the OpenSSH portable developers make privsep work better on their systems. Apparently Solar Designer is the only person who understands the need for this stuff. So, if vendors would JUMP and get it working better, and send us patches IMMEDIATELY, we can perhaps make a 3.3.1p release on Friday which supports these systems better. So send patches by Thursday night please. Then on Tuesday or Wednesday the complete bug report with patches (and exploits soon after I am sure) will hit BUGTRAQ. Let me repeat: even if the bug exists in a privsep'd sshd, it is not exploitable. Clearly we cannot yet publish what the bug is, or provide anyone with the real patch, but we can try to get maximum deployement of privsep, and therefore make it hurt less when the problem is published. So please push your vendor to get us maximally working privsep patches as soon as possible! We've given most vendors since Friday last week untilThursday to get privsep working well for you so that when the announcement comes out next week their customers are immunized. That is nearly a full week (but they have already wasted a weekend and a Monday). Really I think this is the best we can hope to do (this thing will eventually leak, at which point the details will be published). Customers can judge their vendors by how they respond to this issue. OpenBSD and NetBSD users should also update to OpenSSH 3.3 right away. On OpenBSD privsep works flawlessly, and I have reports that is also true on NetBSD. All other systems appear to have minor or major weaknesses when this code is running. . In an email addressed to many in the security community today, including LinuxSecurity, Theo de Raad. email, addressed, security, community, today, linuxsecurity. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
Significant changes in this version include improved support for privilege separation, ssh no longer needs to be installed setuid root for protocol version 2 hostbased authentication, and the client options FallBackToRsh and UseRsh are deprecated.. . .. Significant changes in this version include improved support for privilege separation, ssh no longer needs to be installed setuid root for protocol version 2 hostbased authentication, and the client options FallBackToRsh and UseRsh are deprecated. Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2002 21:50:59 +0200 From: Markus Friedl To:
The goal of this work is complete privilege separation within in OpenSSH. Privilege separation uses two processes: The privileged parent process that monitors the progress of the unprivileged child process. The child process is unprivileged and the only process that processes . . . . The goal of this work is complete privilege separation within in OpenSSH. Privilege separation uses two processes: The privileged parent process that monitors the progress of the unprivileged child process. The child process is unprivileged and the only process that processes network data. The privileged parent can be modelled by a very small finite-state machine so that it is easy to reason about the code that is being executed with privileges. A well defined interface between privileged parent and unprivileged child allows the child to delegate operations that require privileges to the parent. Successful authentication is determined by the parent process. . The goal of this work is complete privilege separation within in OpenSSH. Privilege separation uses . privilege, separation, complete, within, openssh. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
Get the latest Linux and open source security news straight to your inbox.