The Sendmail buffer overflow exploit announced in March will almost certainly be programmed into an automated worm within the next six months. Such a worm could do for UNIX systems what Code Red did to the Windows world -- simply because there are so many potentially vulnerable UNIX systems on the network today. . . .. The Sendmail buffer overflow exploit announced in March will almost certainly be programmed into an automated worm within the next six months. Such a worm could do for UNIX systems what Code Red did to the Windows world -- simply because there are so many potentially vulnerable UNIX systems on the network today. Shutting off the Sendmail daemon on 99.9% of the systems in your environment would greatly reduce the potential impact of such a worm. The Role of the Sendmail Daemon When I discuss security issues with systems administrators, I find that many of them are confused about the need for a running Sendmail daemon on their systems. This confusion is understandable since, for at least the last two decades, the commercial UNIX vendors have been shipping their operating systems with active Sendmail daemons in the default install. Most administrators simply assume that this daemon is necessary for the users and automated processes running on the system to be able to emit email from the machine. The reality, however, is that the Sendmail daemon on a machine is only responsible for two things: Listening on port 25/tcp for incoming messages from outside of the machine Flushing the local queue of unsent messages on a periodic basis Having a Sendmail daemon listening on 25/tcp opens the system up for remote exploits such as the recently announced buffer overflow issue. Note that the system only needs to be listening on 25/tcp if it is actively expecting to receive email messages from other systems. In fact, the only systems on the network that receive external email are the machines that are acting as mail servers and mail relays. A given site will typically only have a small handful ofthese machines (many of which are Windows machines running Exchange anyway). The other 99.9% of the systems on the network are email "clients" -- that is they may emit email messages from time to time, but never expect to receive a message from another machine. On these machines, it is probably best to simply disable the Sendmail daemon altogether in order to eliminate the potential for remote exploits. The link for this article located at SysAdmin is no longer available. . Reduce vulnerabilities stemming from the Sendmail buffer overflow by disabling Sendmail functionalities on non-essential systems to bolster security.. Sendmail Exploit, UNIX Security, Buffer Overflow Prevention, Email Daemon Risks. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
This article is the first one in a series about the main types of security holes in applications. We'll show the ways to avoid them by changing your development habits a little. This set of articles shows methods which can be . . . . This article is the first one in a series about the main types of security holes in applications. We'll show the ways to avoid them by changing your development habits a little. This set of articles shows methods which can be used to damage a Unix system. We could only have mentioned them or said a few words about them, but we prefer complete explanations to make people understand the risks. Thus, when debugging a program or developing your own, you'll be able to avoid or correct these mistakes. For each discussed hole, we will take the same approach. We'll start detailing the way it works. Next, we will show how to avoid it. For every example we will use security holes still present in wide spread software. . Enhance security in your web applications by mastering strategies to prevent vulnerabilities, particularly in CGI scripts, while adhering to optimal coding standards.. Application Security, CGI Scripts, Development Best Practices. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
On Wednesday, the 14,300-strong subscribers to a popular security list known as Vuln-Dev received what may have appeared a rare treat: a message to the list containing source code to a program that gave the user full control of a remote Unix system. But as some Vuln-Dev readers, many of whom are system administrators for businesses, painfully learned, the program was a Trojan horse, and if compiled and run, could delete most of the files on the user's computer.. . .. On Wednesday, the 14,300-strong subscribers to a popular security list known as Vuln-Dev received what may have appeared a rare treat: a message to the list containing source code to a program that gave the user full control of a remote Unix system. But as some Vuln-Dev readers, many of whom are system administrators for businesses, painfully learned, the program was a Trojan horse, and if compiled and run, could delete most of the files on the user's computer. List member Jason Parker told Newsbytes he glanced over the code before compiling it, decided it looked legitimate, and ran it Thursday on the test account of a system. "I lost everything in the home directory, including information I would rather not have lost, but that's the price you pay for trusting," said Parker, who has since replaced the front page of his site with an obscene comment about Meinel. The link for this article located at Newsbytes is no longer available. . Cybersecurity professionals are alerting users about a malicious Trojan horse software that deceptively claims to provide remote access to Linux servers.. Trojan Horse, Unix Control, Security Risks, Source Code, Vuln-Dev. . LinuxSecurity.com Team
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