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Linux eBPF Security Advisory Addresses Kernel Visibility Concerns

The Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) was created to make Linux more observable and secure. It extends kernel functionality without requiring new modules or recompilation, enabling precise monitoring, tracing, and policy enforcement at runtime. For defenders, it promised transparency. For attackers, it opened a new space to hide. . Over the past decade, researchers have confirmed that eBPF’s legitimate capabilities can be turned against the systems they protect. Proofs-of-concept and targeted campaigns have shown that eBPF can intercept traffic, mask activity, and manipulate kernel behavior without surfacing in user-space logs. Operating inside trusted kernel space, eBPF sits below the reach of most audit frameworks and endpoint agents — invaluable for observability, but difficult to monitor once it’s abused. The Linux kernel community has responded with verifier improvements, privilege restrictions, and ongoing hardening efforts. These changes have made unprivileged attacks far less practical, but they haven’t closed the visibility gap. Defenders still struggle to see what happens inside the kernel once eBPF programs are loaded and running. Our research explores that gap: how eBPF became an essential Linux feature, how misuse developed, and why detection continues to lag behind. It draws on verified CVEs, public proofs-of-concept, and 2025 campaign analyses to map eBPF’s evolution from a trusted instrumentation layer into a security blind spot at the core of the Linux kernel. From Observability to Attack Surface eBPF entered the Linux kernel as a leap forward for observability . It lets administrators run verified code directly in kernel space safely, in theory, to trace events, monitor performance, and enforce policy without adding modules or recompiling. The verifier was built to keep that promise, checking every instruction before it could touch kernel memory. But over time, the verifier itself became part of the problem. As new features were added, the logic grewharder to reason about. A single arithmetic slip or pointer check could open paths the verifier was meant to close. What started as a safety net turned into a recurring source of privilege bugs. Key Vulnerabilities Across Kernel Versions CVE-2016-4557 – A flaw in BPF_PROG_LOAD allowed unprivileged users to inject crafted bytecode and gain kernel-level access. CVE-2017-16995 – Pointer mismanagement in the verifier enabled local privilege escalation. CVE-2018-18445 and CVE-2019-7308 – Out-of-bounds and bounds-checking issues exposed kernel memory and granted read/write primitives. CVE-2021-3490 – ALU32 bounds miscalculations reopened escalation paths even in modern kernel versions. Each generation of these flaws followed the same pattern: as eBPF grew more capable, the verifier’s attack surface expanded with it. More complexity meant more places to hide a mistake, and attackers learned how to find them. How eBPF Moved from Research to Real-World Abuse As eBPF matured, researchers began testing how far its capabilities could stretch. What started as observability experiments evolved into controlled demonstrations of stealth and persistence inside the Linux kernel. These weren’t active attacks; they were technical proofs showing what an attacker could do once root access was already obtained. The turning point came with Black Hat’s With Friends Like eBPF, Who Needs Enemies? , which showed how eBPF could run hidden logic directly in kernel space. After that, open-source rootkits appeared: Boopkit, TripleCross, and ebpfkit, each built to test how much control could be achieved without modifying the kernel itself. What These Experiments Exposed Legitimate code, hidden intent. These rootkits stayed within verifier-approved rules, running as sanctioned eBPF programs instead of suspicious modules. Stealth through system design. They used normal kernel hooks, tracepoints, kprobes, and maps for stealth. Persistence, not entry. Noneof these tools exploited eBPF to gain access. They showed how a privileged attacker could remain undetected once inside. For defenders, that’s where the blind spot came into focus. Programs operating at this layer don’t appear in /proc, system logs, or audit trails. Even a secured Linux host can run hostile logic beneath the view of traditional EDR or forensics. This phase didn’t mark a new attack wave. It marked a visibility failure. Once the security community saw how legitimate kernel logic could be repurposed for stealth, the question changed from “Is eBPF dangerous?” to “Why can’t we see it?” How the Linux Security Community Turned eBPF Into a Defensive Tool By the time eBPF-based rootkits moved from research to real deployments, the Linux security community had started to adapt. The first responses weren’t about containment — they were about visibility. If attackers could hide in the kernel, defenders needed a way to see there, too. Red Canary’s analysis of eBPF-based malware captured this shift clearly. It marked eBPF implants as a distinct Linux malware class, noting that they operated entirely within verifier-approved boundaries. No kernel modules, no syscall hooks, and no traces in /proc. The problem wasn’t access; it was observability. That insight shaped the next wave of defensive innovation. Aqua Security’s Tracee used eBPF itself to instrument the kernel for runtime detection, surfacing process creation, privilege changes, and network events without invasive hooks. Red Canary expanded that approach with eBPFmon, designed to watch eBPF activity in real time and flag unapproved programs or maps before they could be abused. The eBPF Foundation’s threat model and verifier audit were built on those lessons, calling for token-based verifier access and stricter limits on unprivileged use. The Linux kernel community, meanwhile, continued to harden verifier logic and tighten boundaries around privileged loading. Together, these changes reflected acoordinated awareness: eBPF wasn’t a threat by design. It was a visibility challenge by omission. eBPF was no longer an obscure subsystem buried in kernel docs. It became part of the active threat landscape and the toolkit used to defend it. Progress is visible but uneven. Many SOC pipelines still can’t correlate eBPF behavior or state across hosts, leaving partial sight lines into the kernel. Linux security isn’t about isolating eBPF; it’s about integrating it responsibly. Visibility, not restriction, remains the real defense. eBPF in the Wild: What BPFDoor Reveals About Linux Visibility Gaps Our latest research confirms that eBPF-based persistence is no longer confined to demonstrations or security conferences. BPFDoor represents the first observed case of an eBPF backdoor operating on production Linux systems — not through kernel exploits, but through legitimate hooks repurposed for control. The implant constructs its communication channel using packet filters, allowing it to monitor and manipulate network traffic directly within the kernel. Commands and responses blend seamlessly with normal traffic. Because it uses eBPF itself as the delivery mechanism, there’s no module load, no filesystem artifact, and almost no process-level footprint. Traditional detection tools that monitor binaries and syscalls see nothing unusual. Forensic review of confirmed infections shows a consistent pattern: persistence through pinned eBPF maps, command execution via hidden network triggers, and control traffic masquerading as routine system activity. Each component fits within verifier-approved behavior, meaning even hardened kernels allow it to run as designed. In response, new community frameworks now focus on surfacing eBPF state in real time. Early prototypes can list loaded programs, trace active maps, and compare signatures against baseline system behavior. They’re not perfect, but they mark a shift toward kernel-layer observability that defenders haven’t had before. The keyinsight from this stage of research isn’t just that eBPF can be abused; it’s that the boundary between instrumentation and intrusion is thinner than anyone expected. BPFDoor didn’t exploit a vulnerability; it exploited design trust. That’s the real challenge for Linux security moving forward: building visibility into the parts of the kernel that were never designed to hide, yet now can. The Visibility Gap: Why Linux Defenders Miss eBPF Activity Most Linux defenses still look in the wrong place. Antivirus and EDR tools monitor user-space processes, file activity, and network sockets, but eBPF operates at a lower level. Once a program attaches to the kernel, it can operate quietly through tracepoints, kprobes, traffic control, or XDP hooks without ever triggering a user-space alert. That invisibility is built into the design. Syslog and auditd don’t log eBPF activity. Even when malicious code runs in kernel space, nothing looks out of place. A defender checking system logs will see silence. Run bpftool prog show, however, and the truth appears: active programs that don’t exist anywhere else in process listings or endpoint dashboards. The LinuxSecurity.com research team confirmed this gap while reviewing open detection frameworks such as Windshock, which notes plainly: “Linux antivirus solutions cannot monitor in-kernel eBPF activity.” The issue isn’t a lack of sensors; it’s that existing telemetry doesn’t reach deep enough to see where eBPF runs. This visibility problem is uniquely Linux. On other platforms, comparable hooks are exposed through monitored APIs or signed driver models. eBPF executes inside trusted kernel space, under the same permissions as the system itself. That makes it both powerful and opaque, a place where normal defensive tooling simply can’t see. Safe Enumeration and Detection Building visibility into eBPF activity doesn’t require intrusive scans or exploit testing — it starts with basic enumeration. Every Linux defender should be able tolist what’s loaded into kernel space and confirm that what’s running matches what should be there. Step 1 — Enumerate Active Programs and Maps Use bpftool to list loaded programs and pinned maps directly from kernel space: bpftool -j prog show > /tmp/ebpf-progs.json bpftool -j map show > /tmp/ebpf-maps.json ls /sys/fs/bpf These commands capture every active eBPF object, even those invisible to user-space process listings or traditional endpoint agents. Step 2 — Correlate Activity with Runtime Tools Pair bpftool with runtime detectors such as Tracee or Falco to flag load and attach events in real time. Compare that telemetry with system logs or audit data to confirm what conventional visibility misses. Step 3 — Establish a Baseline Export eBPF program and map data as JSON artifacts and track them over time. Regular snapshots help identify unauthorized loads or configuration drift before they turn into persistence. All of these steps are non-invasive and safe to run on production systems. They don’t modify kernel state or interfere with running workloads. For enterprise Linux environments, this method is the foundation of eBPF visibility — a low-friction way to prove what’s really running at the kernel level and start closing one of Linux security’s most persistent blind spots. Linux Security Controls to Apply Visibility only matters if it leads to action. Once defenders understand how to identify eBPF activity, the next step is to minimize its potential for abuse without disabling it entirely. These are Linux-native controls that keep eBPF functional for observability while closing the paths attackers use most. Restrict Capabilities and Privileges Limit what processes can do before they ever reach the kernel. Drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN from containers and user namespaces wherever possible. Disable unprivileged eBPF loading with: echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled This ensures only trusted, privilegedprocesses can load kernel-level programs. Hardened Kernel Configuration Enforce mandatory access controls that limit direct BPF system calls. SELinux and AppArmor can both confine eBPF execution through targeted policy modules. These settings block unauthorized probes and ensure only approved daemons can attach to tracepoints or sockets. Enhance Monitoring and Detection Extend runtime monitoring with tools like Tracee or Falco. Create or import rules that flag unexpected eBPF program loads, unloads, or unusual attachment events. When correlated with baseline data, those alerts mark the difference between legitimate observability and suspicious kernel activity. Validate with Forensic Snapshots When compromise is suspected, virtualization or hypervisor snapshots provide a clean way to examine persistent kernel-resident eBPF programs. Memory forensics has proven effective for uncovering these implants in controlled environments. Periodic forensic validation ensures that visibility doesn’t stop when systems are offline. Apply Trusted Guidance The eBPF Foundation’s threat model and verifier audit outlines clear deployment recommendations, including tokenized verifier access and limited unprivileged BPF operations. Following those guidelines keeps implementations aligned with upstream security priorities. With these controls in place, Linux defenders can maintain the visibility eBPF was built for while denying attackers the invisibility they’ve learned to exploit. The Future of eBPF in Linux Security eBPF isn’t going away; it’s becoming essential. Modern observability and security frameworks depend on it to trace kernel events in real time. But as adoption grows, so does attacker opportunity. Malicious eBPF programs can blend with legitimate telemetry agents, making detection harder for defenders focused only on the user space. Future defenses will hinge on stronger verification and provenance controls — kernel-level signing, token-based verifier access, andcontinuous inspection of runtime eBPF state. Research is already exploring these directions, including kernel-level hidden rootkit detection using eBPF itself, where the same framework that attackers abuse becomes the engine for defense. For that to work, Linux needs consistent telemetry standards that reach the kernel layer. SOCs and enterprise defenders must treat kernel-space observability as a first-class requirement, not a niche tool for debugging. eBPF’s future isn’t about restriction; it’s about clarity. The more transparent its operation becomes, the harder it is to hide within it. Securing the Kernel’s Own Security Engine eBPF was built to strengthen Linux visibility and control. It succeeded, but that same capability has created new terrain for attackers. What began as an observability framework has evolved into a critical security surface, one that defenders can no longer afford to ignore. The evidence forms a clear arc from verifier flaws and public rootkits to modern detection frameworks and confirmed operations like BPFDoor. Each phase reinforces one message: Linux security no longer stops at the kernel boundary. Defenders now face a dual responsibility: to use eBPF for visibility while ensuring that visibility extends to eBPF itself. The technology isn’t a threat to be removed, but rather a system to understand, instrument, and monitor. eBPF is the kernel’s own security engine. The challenge, and opportunity, for the Linux community is learning how to secure it with the same precision it was designed to provide. . Research reveals the potential misuse of eBPF in Linux; security measures are evolving to close these visibility gaps.. extended, berkeley, packet, filter, (ebpf), created, linux, observable, secure. . MaK Ulac

Oct 10, 2025 •

MaK Ulac

security advisorysecurity issuecritical

Active Wing FTP Exploits Demand Immediate Action from Linux Admins

Picture this: It’s July 2, 2025, and you’re unwinding from a long day, only to hear about a zero-day vulnerability being actively exploited. If you’re running Wing FTP Server on Linux—or any other OS, for that matter—you might’ve just lucked into a sleepless night. CVE-2025-47812 is here, and it’s not messing around. Attackers are already out there, leveraging it to turn vulnerable servers into their playgrounds. If your servers are part of a production setup, the stakes are even higher. . We’re talking about a remote code execution vulnerability, exploitable by anyone with an internet connection and just enough knowledge to craft the exploit. And let me be blunt: when successfully exploited, this flaw doesn’t just dent your system—it can tear the entire thing wide open, handing attackers SYSTEM or root access, depending on the platform. Whether it's sensitive data, system integrity, or just your peace of mind, CVE-2025-47812 wants it all. So, What’s the Deal with CVE-2025-47812? Wing FTP Server hosts are at risk if they’re running versions prior to 7.4.4. This newly disclosed vulnerability takes advantage of how the server processes null bytes and Lua injection in the username field during authentication. Null bytes, it turns out, are tricky little devils, and the way they’re mishandled here lets crafty attackers disrupt session handling and inject malicious Lua code into session files. From there, the exploit chain practically executes itself. How Does This Flaw Work? Here’s a simplified rundown of the exploit sequence: The Initial Jab Attackers hit the server’s loginok.html endpoint using a carefully crafted POST request. The payload includes a null byte (%00) and malicious Lua code appended to the username parameter. This isn’t just gibberish—it’s a calculated move to mess with how the server parses data. Dropping the Payload The manipulated login request causes Wing FTP Server to store malicious Lua code in session files.Normally, these files are innocuous bits of session data, but now they've become loaded weapons, sitting on your server. Execution, No Questions Asked The next time Wing FTP Server loads those session files—for example, when the malicious “user” interacts with the server—the embedded Lua code executes. And if you’re running as root, congratulations, the attacker is now root too. Sticking Around Persistent attackers might go the extra mile to create new backdoor accounts, install malicious binaries, or just quietly wait for the right moment to exfiltrate data. Even after you think you’ve booted them out, their hooks could still be deep in your system. Why Should You Care About This Threat? It’s not just about the mechanics; it’s about the implications. Successful exploitation means the attacker gets full administrative rights over your server. Think about that for a second—full control. All it takes is an unpatched Wing FTP Server exposed to the internet or, worse, running with weak credentials or anonymous access switched on. The fact that this exploit surfaced just one day after public disclosure is chilling. It tells you two things: (1) there’s a low technical barrier to pulling this off, and (2) attackers are organized enough to deploy quickly. This isn’t some wannabe hacker; these are pros picking servers apart in real time. What Linux Admins Should Do In Response to CVE-2025-47812 Here’s the deal: If you’re running Wing FTP Server and you haven’t patched it yesterday, there’s no time left to procrastinate. Start by checking your version. Anything older than 7.4.4 is vulnerable. Upgrade immediately. You can grab the latest version from Wing FTP’s official site . It comes with specific fixes for null byte injection and Lua execution vulnerabilities. While you’re at it, let’s clean house. Patching is just step one. This is a wake-up call to revisit everything you thought you knew was "secure." Here’s a checklist to get started: LockDown Authentication: Disable anonymous access. Unless you have a painfully good reason to allow it, shut it off. Also, it is crucial to enforce strong passwords. Randomized, long, and never reused. Make it harder for someone to brute force or guess their way in. Restrict Network Exposure: Limiting where your server is reachable from can’t be overstated. Roll out firewall rules that restrict Wing FTP access to known, trusted IPs. Got HTTP/S or FTP/S functionality enabled, but not using it? Kill it. Every open port is just another potential way in. Dig Through the Logs: Heads-up! Attackers aren’t subtle. Check your logs for any user entries that look out of place. Exploit attempts may show up as malformed usernames like anonymous\n or session files with strange Lua scripts planted inside. Look for .lua session files with odd filenames—maybe around 64 random hex characters. Got inflated session files? That’s a potential red flag. Commands like curl , wget, or even whoami in forensic data? Someone’s likely made themselves at home. Stop Future Damage: Apply an SELinux or AppArmor profile to Wing FTP so the app can only do what it’s supposed to. Lock down the permissions of the Wing FTP directory. Install runtime protection tools like auditd or something heavier to catch anything sketchy in real time. And here’s a simple but often skipped step: Backups . If you haven't been keeping encrypted, offline backups of critical data, do it now. A backup could mean the difference between a headache and an outright disaster. Our Final Thoughts: Be Proactive, Not Lucky CVE-2025-47812 isn’t the kind of vulnerability you can afford to ignore. Whether you’re the one staying up 24/7 to fight the fire or just the admin who wants to stay a step ahead, patching your system should be non-negotiable by now. The exploitation is active, it’s automated, and it’s effective. Don’t be the server admin who gets caught with their guard down. Even after patching, securitydoesn’t end there. This incident should remind us all that our systems are only as secure as the attention and care we give them. So stay sharp. Because as soon as this CVE fades, we can be sure there’s another one waiting in the shadows. . Active exploitation of CVE-2025-47812 in Wing FTP Server demands urgent upgrades for Linux security.. picture, you’re, unwinding, about. . Brittany Day

Jul 14, 2025 •

Brittany Day

security issuefirewallcyber attack

DDoS Threats: Understanding the Limitations of Your Linux Firewall

Nowadays, Linux systems are considered fairly secure, as people think that Linux rarely gets infected with malware such as viruses, rootkits, worms, etc. You might also see that we hardly ever come across Antivirus software being sold for Linux, giving the illusion that Linux is an ultimately secure Operating System.. Given that roughly 75 percent of the world's servers run on Linux, we can’t truly believe that Linux is as secure as we think it is. Linux is only as secure as the person controlling and configuring it. Essentially, if a user has bad security practices, e.g. opening unauthorized emails or downloading potentially malicious links, then there is a very high chance that their Linux system will be compromised. A Linux firewall is defined as a solution or service that regulates, protects, and blocks network traffic as it passes to and from a Linux-based environment. Ultimately, it keeps your Linux systems secure by filtering certain network traffic that can be sent and received by the system itself. By default, Linux uses nftables, the successor of iptables, as a firewall and it does a fairly good job of keeping Linux Systems secure and mitigating potential attacks, especially if you have a good Security Engineer within your organization who is quite proficient with the tool. However, it does raise a very valid question: What attacks can’t this Linux firewall protect against? Whether you are using a paid firewall service or whether you are using the built-in iptables tool, there are just some attacks that the Linux firewall cannot protect against! Follow along with us as we go through what these attacks are and how they can affect your system. Nearly Impossible Attacks to Stop DDoS Attacks Like most cyberattacks, the deadliest ones come from within. Now with a normal DoS attack or DDoS attack, it can be managed and certain measures can be set in place to mitigate these attacks. The DDoS attack we will be talking about is a little more aggressive in terms of the methods it uses tosuccessfully execute the attack. We will be speaking on Reflection Attacks, specifically, reflected DoS and DDoS amplification attacks. I know you may be wondering what exactly is a Reflected Amplification attack but do not fear! Keep following along as we discover more about what they are. Reflected Amplification Attacks Reflection Amplification, simply put, is a combination of two techniques that allows cybercriminals to magnify the amount of malicious traffic they can generate and obscure the sources of the attack traffic. Let's split these two words to kind of get a better understanding. Reflection Attacks Simply put, reflection attacks are attacks that use the same protocol in both directions. The attacker spoofs the victim’s IP address and sends a request for information via UDP to servers known to respond to that type of request. The server answers the request and sends the response to the victim’s IP address. From the servers’ perspective, it was the victim who sent the original request. All the data from those servers pile up, congesting the target’s Internet connectivity. With the maximized bandwidth, normal traffic cannot be serviced and clients cannot connect. Any server open to the Internet and running UDP-based services can be used as a reflector. Amplification Attacks Amplification attacks increase the amount of data passing around. Essentially, an attacker uses a modest number of machines with little bandwidth to send fairly substantial attacks. Reflection /Amplification Attacks Together These two attacks alone can be fairly managed but when put together, not even the bests of firewalls can stop this, especially with a seasoned attacker behind the controls. They send a tremendous amount of spoofed packets causing systems to freeze, crash, or even reboot. The way an attacker carries on with this type of attack is actually through misconfiguration of the firewall in place. Almost all change and error is caused by human fault and in this instance, misconfigurationsof firewalls are the main culprit and reason for these types of attacks. Even then, if properly configured, you might still find yourself in the midst of a DDoS attack. Other Types of DoS/DDoS Attacks Buffer Overflow: Buffer Overflow attacks, as listed above, are a common type of DoS attack. It relies on sending an amount of traffi c to a network resource that exceeds the default processing capacity of the system. Ping of Death: Attackers send spoofed packets that ping every computer on the targeted network. The target responds and becomes flooded with responses from the malicious packet. It is also known as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Flood and Smurf Attack. SYN Flood: A SYN Flood attack exploits the TCP handshake – a method used for the TCP network to create a connection with a local host/client/server. Unfortunately, the handshake is left incomplete, leaving the connected host in an occupied status and unavailable to take further requests. Attackers will increase the number of requests, saturating all open ports and preventing anyone from connecting to the network. Teardrop: In a teardrop attack, IP data packet fragments are sent to the target network. The network then reassembles the fragments into the original packet. The process of reassembling these fragments exhausts the system and it ends up crashing. It crashes because the fragments are designed to confuse the system so it can never be put back together. If any of these other DoS/DDoS methods are used within a Reflection/Amplification attack, there is a good chance your Linux systems cannot withstand an attack of his magnitude. Misconfigurations in Web Applications Everyone that uses a web application has one thing in common, they are (mostly) all protected by a firewall. However, having a firewall doesn’t necessarily mean your system is secure. A firewall may be secure to the naked eye, but if it’s protecting a web application that has existing vulnerabilities, a Cyber Criminal can easilybypass it. There are countless examples of software vulnerabilities that hackers can exploit to bypass the firewall. Firewalls themselves also have vulnerabilities, normally caused by misconfiguration. Misconfigurations at the application layer, such as an error in configuring a WAF, can lead to a series of different attacks, such as SQL injections, CSRF, or even XSS. Furthermore, once the application vulnerability is exploited, it can lead to the Cyber Criminal gaining elevated access to the database, host server, and possibly more systems within a company. This is why it’s important to ensure to install the latest updates and patches and also, continually monitor events and logs. On top of staying up to date with updates and patches, as well as monitoring logs, you can invest in a good WAF. Malicious Scripts If an attacker manages to find their way onto your system, you would think your firewall or Intrusion Detection System would pick it up! Unfortunately, attackers have even managed to make their way around that. Nowadays, there are scripts that are meant to bypass firewalls and intrusion detection systems. Most Linux systems and servers deploy firewalls as a defense mechanism. In some malicious scripts, attackers try to disable the firewall (ufw) as a defense evasive tactic. Along with that, attackers also remove iptables rules (using iptables -F) because it is widely used for managing the firewall rules on Linux systems and servers. Another possible shell script would be one that disables certain Linux security modules such as SElinux, Apparmor, and other applications alike. These modules can be configured to grant users certain privileges and a seasoned attacker can create a script to manipulate these modules and grant themselves access as well. What Can YOU Do? I know we just went over nearly impossible attacks to defend against, so you must be thinking what can you possibly do?! Well, there are actually quite a few things we can do to mitigate these attacks. Follow along with the listbelow: Use up-to-date code dependencies, and third-party components, and update your web server/server Make sure you have recent security updates and patches installed for all software and hardware Properly configure any security tools and configuration files, such as PHP.ini and iptables, in your Linux environment Make sure that you have installed and properly configured an Intrusion Detection System Make sure to properly monitor any traffic that might seem suspicious Use vulnerability scanners to fully assess your web applications and your servers Limit any traffic to and from your server to malicious and black-listed IP addresses Properly educate yourself/your team on security protocols and stay up to date with recent malware/ransomware so you don't find yourself in a Zero-day attack If you follow along with this checklist and continually educate yourself on the possible vulnerabilities that are out there and that could potentially be in your system, you can properly mitigate most of these attacks. Our Thoughts As Cyber Criminals are using more sophisticated methods for attacks, it becomes increasingly important to monitor and record the activities happening on your system. It is important to have properly configured systems, firewalls, and all security features & patches updated to be able to properly defend against these types of attacks. It is a scary world out there and as everything becomes more digitized, we need to do our best efforts in keeping the systems that hold all our sensitive information safe. Make sure to check out our vulnerability basics (insert link here) article to further understand what vulnerabilities you might be encountering and make sure to check our WAF article to see how to keep your Web Applications secure! . As Linux systems gain traction globally, it's crucial to understand which threats can evade your firewall defenses and how to safeguard against these vulnerabilities.. Linux Firewall Attacks,DDoS Prevention,Security Best Practices.. Brian Gomez

Jul 27, 2022 •

Brian Gomez

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