ArchLinux: 201601-19: ntp: time alteration
Summary
If ntpd is always started with the -g option, which is common and against long-standing recommendation, and if at the moment ntpd is restarted an attacker can immediately respond to enough requests from enough sources trusted by the target, which is difficult and not common, there is a window of opportunity where the attacker can cause ntpd to set the time to an arbitrary value. Similarly, if an attacker is able to respond to enough requests from enough sources trusted by the target, the attacker can cause ntpd to abort and restart, at which point it can tell the target to set the time to an arbitrary value if and only if ntpd was re-started against long-standing recommendation with the -g flag, or if ntpd was not given the -g flag, the attacker can move the target system's time by at most 900 seconds' time per attack.
Resolution
Upgrade to 4.2.8.p5-1.
# pacman -Syu "ntp>=4.2.8.p5-1"
The problem has been fixed upstream in version 4.2.8.p5.
References
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2015-5300 https://www.ntp.org/support/securitynotice/ntpbug2956/ https://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/NTPattack.html
Workaround
Removing -g from the ntpd startup options limits the time modification
to 900s per attack.
This can be done by editing the ExecStart line of the
/usr/lib/systemd/system/ntpd.service file to remove the -g option, then
issuing:
# systemctl daemon-reload
# systemctl restart ntpd