Debian: sane-backends multiple vulnerabilities

    Date 11 Sep 2003
    Posted By LinuxSecurity Advisories
    Thes problems allowa remote attacker to cause a segfault fault and/or consume arbitraryamounts of memory.
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    Debian Security Advisory DSA 379-1                     This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.                             Martin Schulze
    September 11th, 2003           
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    Package        : sane-backends
    Vulnerability  : several vulnerabilities
    Problem-Type   : remote
    Debian-specific: no
    CVE references : CAN-2003-0773 CAN-2003-0774 CAN-2003-0775 CAN-2003-0776 CAN-2003-0777 CAN-2003-0778
    Alexander Hvostov, Julien Blache and Aurelien Jarno discovered several
    security-related problems in the sane-backends package, which contains
    an API library for scanners including a scanning daemon (in the
    package libsane) that can be remotely exploited.  Thes problems allow
    a remote attacker to cause a segfault fault and/or consume arbitrary
    amounts of memory.  The attack is successful, even if the attacker's
    computer isn't listed in saned.conf.
    You are only vulnerable if you actually run saned e.g. in xinetd or
    inetd.  If the entries in the configuration file of xinetd or inetd
    respectively are commented out or do not exist, you are safe.
    Try "telnet localhost 6566" on the server that may run saned.  If you
    get "connection refused" saned is not running and you are safe.
    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project identifies the
    following problems:
       saned checks the identity (IP address) of the remote host only
       after the first communication took place (SANE_NET_INIT).  So
       everyone can send that RPC, even if the remote host is not allowed
       to scan (not listed in saned.conf).
       saned lacks error checking nearly everywhere in the code. So
       connection drops are detected very late. If the drop of the
       connection isn't detected, the access to the internal wire buffer
       leaves the limits of the allocated memory. So random memory "after"
       the wire buffer is read which will be followed by a segmentation
       If saned expects strings, it mallocs the memory necessary to store
       the complete string after it receives the size of the string. If
       the connection was dropped before transmitting the size, malloc
       will reserve an arbitrary size of memory. Depending on that size
       and the amount of memory available either malloc fails (->saned
       quits nicely) or a huge amount of memory is allocated. Swapping and
       and OOM measures may occur depending on the kernel.
       saned doesn't check the validity of the RPC numbers it gets before
       getting the parameters.
       If debug messages are enabled and a connection is dropped,
       non-null-terminated strings may be printed and segamentation faults
       may occur.
       It's possible to allocate an arbitrary amount of memory on the
       server running saned even if the connection isn't dropped.  At the
       moment this can not easily be fixed according to the author.
       Better limit the total amount of memory saned may use (ulimit).
    For the stable distribution (woody) this problem has been
    fixed in version 1.0.7-4.
    For the unstable distribution (sid) this problem has been fixed in
    version 1.0.11-1 and later.
    We recommend that you upgrade your libsane packages.
    Upgrade Instructions
    - --------------------
    wget url
            will fetch the file for you
    dpkg -i file.deb
            will install the referenced file.
    If you are using the apt-get package manager, use the line for
    sources.list as given below:
    apt-get update
            will update the internal database
    apt-get upgrade
            will install corrected packages
    You may use an automated update by adding the resources from the
    footer to the proper configuration.
    Debian GNU/Linux 3.0 alias woody
    - --------------------------------
      Source archives:
          Size/MD5 checksum:      650 fce2bccda1eca4e4185deee5681f738f
          Size/MD5 checksum:    27898 56454dddbb589c56c5404c3228c0e4e8
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1867577 6010d68d8a8c29d1dcbf0c6d5005770b
      Alpha architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1797436 3cc566a8518565d305f8d81d3fa6d766
          Size/MD5 checksum:  5560004 5b99bc14cb5207a656ed0f11b9f43d05
      ARM architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1590972 2a1255e8be662d9415096eec2cc33d8e
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4750680 20fba2388a627f9504cbc621873e2d7a
      Intel IA-32 architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1451240 c0726d631d9426eaecd8aaa2667eb801
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4524636 37934f30ed8726f7f39791cfb2760bb5
      Intel IA-64 architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  2240324 3efa00ae110d3dae825b39685d24ff93
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4892446 9ce7e0ff7db5e7bebe6b9c5497d9c855
      HP Precision architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1762866 7a2d25d300f2aef6972c656f1cf0918e
          Size/MD5 checksum:  5099552 d529ee8a61cd316ae2d19d1ecf2ae249
      Motorola 680x0 architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1447178 b499ce366fc07a291b00edcacdf2312d
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4410546 40a8fb70043f6f84e0cd7a02d1428b31
      Big endian MIPS architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1488654 f9e09f27924d704d35dec4ab2b42c84d
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4859694 08ec5fdf4c847800d82935fbe782179f
      Little endian MIPS architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1490928 87a4f046310a9e76917fa16df8271c3d
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4624290 314367f2ea0ef4328a1a904236452528
      PowerPC architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1597728 b9b3588129d046d76b1bde2f20d51e4a
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4913074 6e7d5fcf31ccff0be85b9b6855a117b4
      IBM S/390 architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1492610 c80c5467c124f57da1a0ec0d78be75b0
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4566136 68d3e765375e43ea891a5a9f39fdc40a
      Sun Sparc architecture:
          Size/MD5 checksum:  1584884 b84ac77275bd2910851e0f4f35d22a4d
          Size/MD5 checksum:  4770392 d64709c90f73c1f9259f96a54e5bcb45
      These files will probably be moved into the stable distribution on
      its next revision.
    - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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