SUSE: 2006-053 Critical: Adobe Flash Player Security Vulnerability

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______________________________________________________________________________

                        SUSE Security Announcement

        Package:                acroread 5
        Announcement ID:        SUSE-SA:2005:042
        Date:                   Thu, 14 Jul 2005 15:00:00 +0000
        Affected Products:      9.0, 9.1, 9.2
                                SUSE Linux Desktop 1
                                SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8, 9
                                Novell Linux Desktop 9
                                Open Enterprise Server 9
        Vulnerability Type:     remote code execution
        Severity (1-10):        8
        SUSE Default Package:   yes
        Cross-References:       CAN-2005-1625

    Content of This Advisory:
        1) Security Vulnerability Resolved:
             Buffer overflow in Acrobat Reader 5
           Problem Description
        2) Solution or Work-Around
        3) Special Instructions and Notes
        4) Package Location and Checksums
        5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds:
            See SUSE Security Summary Report.
        6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information

______________________________________________________________________________

1) Problem Description and Brief Discussion

   This update fixes a buffer overflow in Acrobat Reader versions 5,
   where an attacker could execute code by providing a handcrafted PDF
   to the viewer.

   The Acrobat Reader 5 versions of SUSE Linux 9.0 up to 9.2, SUSE
   Linux Enterprise Server 9 and Novell Linux Desktop 9 were upgraded
   to Acrobat Reader 7.

   Unfortunately this version upgrade introduces new dependencies. Please
   use the YaST module "Install or Remove Software" to check if there
   are new dependencies and install the required packages.

   Since Adobe does no longer provide updated packages that work on SUSE
   Linux Enterprise Server 8, United Linux 1, and SUSE Linux Desktop 1
   we are unable to provide fixed packages for these products.

   The SUSE Security Team strongly advises to deinstall the acroread
   package on these platforms and use alternate PDF viewers like xpdf,
   kpdf, gpdf or gv.

   Since this attack could be done via E-Mail messages or web pages,
   this should be considered to be remote exploitable.

   This issue is tracked by the Mitre CVE ID CAN-2005-1625.

2) Solution or Work-Around

   Install the upgraded packages.

3) Special Instructions and Notes

   On SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 and SUSE Linux Desktop 1, deinstall
   the acroread package using:
   	rpm -e acroread

   On all other platforms, start the YaST "Install and Remove Software" dialog
   and solve potential conflicts that are the results of this version upgrade.

4) Package Location and Checksums

   The preferred method for installing security updates is to use the YaST
   Online Update (YOU) tool. YOU detects which updates are required and
   automatically performs the necessary steps to verify and install them.
   Alternatively, download the update packages for your distribution manually
   and verify their integrity by the methods listed in Section 6 of this
   announcement. Then install the packages using the command

     rpm -Fhv 

   to apply the update, replacing  with the filename of the
   downloaded RPM package.

   Our maintenance customers are notified individually. The packages are
   offered for installation from the maintenance web.


   x86 Platform:

   SUSE Linux 9.3:
             1adefcf655eda81fd6df960e19957935

   SUSE Linux 9.2:
             d8acc30fd018f79add163efca641ed56
             9f29b592c1ff6b30f31fd1e1d99e4a6c
             98535e2474fb009c2de160b22ec269b7

   SUSE Linux 9.1:
             499c9ec2b868240e0642164ff449a67c
   source rpm(s):
             ec0733e544a324ca37f5a7a92ed75e14

   SUSE Linux 9.0:
             0ac3ed2c776fbe02b26315078c80bb6e
   source rpm(s):
             2a2c275b272ee60c9e8b08e072f9cb36


______________________________________________________________________________

5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds:

   See SUSE Security Summary Report.
______________________________________________________________________________

6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information

  - Announcement authenticity verification:

    SUSE security announcements are published via mailing lists and on Web
    sites. The authenticity and integrity of a SUSE security announcement is
    guaranteed by a cryptographic signature in each announcement. All SUSE
    security announcements are published with a valid signature.

    To verify the signature of the announcement, save it as text into a file
    and run the command

      gpg --verify 

    replacing  with the name of the file where you saved the
    announcement. The output for a valid signature looks like:

      gpg: Signature made  using RSA key ID 3D25D3D9
      gpg: Good signature from "SuSE Security Team "

    where  is replaced by the date the document was signed.

    If the security team's key is not contained in your key ring, you can
    import it from the first installation CD. To import the key, use the
    command

      gpg --import gpg-pubkey-3d25d3d9-36e12d04.asc

  - Package authenticity verification:

    SUSE update packages are available on many mirror FTP servers all over the
    world. While this service is considered valuable and important to the free
    and open source software community, the authenticity and the integrity of
    a package needs to be verified to ensure that it has not been tampered
    with.

    There are two verification methods that can be used independently from
    each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or RPM package:

    1) Using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package
    2) MD5 checksums as provided in this announcement

    1) The internal rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the
       authenticity of an RPM package. Use the command

        rpm -v --checksig 

       to verify the signature of the package, replacing  with the
       filename of the RPM package downloaded. The package is unmodified if it
       contains a valid signature from build@suse.de with the key ID 9C800ACA.

       This key is automatically imported into the RPM database (on
       RPMv4-based distributions) and the gpg key ring of 'root' during
       installation. You can also find it on the first installation CD and at
       the end of this announcement.

    2) If you need an alternative means of verification, use the md5sum
       command to verify the authenticity of the packages. Execute the command

         md5sum 

       after you downloaded the file from a SUSE FTP server or its mirrors.
       Then compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
       SUSE security announcement. Because the announcement containing the
       checksums is cryptographically signed (by security@suse.de), the
       checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package if the
       signature of the announcement is valid. Note that the md5 sums
       published in the SUSE Security Announcements are valid for the
       respective packages only. Newer versions of these packages cannot be
       verified.

  - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
    subscribe:

    suse-security@suse.com
        -   General Linux and SUSE security discussion.
            All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an e-mail to
                .

    suse-security-announce@suse.com
        -   SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
            Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an e-mail to
                .

    For general information or the frequently asked questions (FAQ),
    send mail to  or
    .

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