This guest editorial by Victor Yodaiken looks at several operating system (OS) certifications that have recently been used as ammunition against Linux by real-time OS vendors targeting the high-security and military markets. It also debunks several emotional and inflamatory arguments impugning Linux security. . . .
Remarks attributed to Gene Spafford and Cynthia Irvine by the EE Times and a marketing offensive by Green Hills against Linux don't provide an accurate picture of software security issues for operating systems and, in fact, add to the confusion. In what follows, I want to try to move the discussion to a less emotional and more balanced basis. One of my points is that security certifications have serious limitations and costs. That's not to say that certifications are bad or useless -- far from it. But certification is not a cure-all, or without problems, and people need to be able to distinguish between marketing and actual engineering.

1. Professor Spafford's complaint about the "provenance" of code in Linux's open development model is unfounded. There is no assurance that any software development effort is free from people who have bad intent or who just write lousy software. The US government's highest security agencies have discovered spies working at the most trusted levels - does anyone realistically expect that software companies will adopt more rigorous screening than the CIA? In any case, it's not clear that it is easier to get code into Linux than it is to get code into other operating systems.

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