______________________________________________________________________________

                        SuSE Security Announcement

        Package:                apache-contrib
        Announcement-ID:        SuSE-SA:2001:31
        Date:                   Monday, September 10th 2001 12:30 MEST
        Affected SuSE versions: 7.1, 7.2
        Vulnerability Type:     authentication bypass
        Severity (1-10):        3
        SuSE default package:   no
        Other affected systems: yes

        Content of this advisory:
        1) security vulnerability resolved:  mod_auth_mysql
           problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information
        2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds
        3) standard appendix (further information)

______________________________________________________________________________

1)  problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information

  The Apache module mod_auth_mysql 1.4,which is shipped since SuSE Linux 7.1,
  was found vulnerable to possible bypass authentication by MySQL command
  injection.
  An adversary could insert MySQL commands along with a password and these
  commands will be interpreted by MySQL while mod_auth_mysql is doing the
  password lookup in the database. A positive authentication could be returned.

  Note, that this bug has not yet been proven exploitable so far.

  A temporary fix does not exist; we recommend to update your system with the
  new RPM from our FTP server.

  Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its
  integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement.
  Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Uhv file.rpm" to apply
  the update.

  After installing the updated RPM run
    - rcapache restart
    - SuSEconfig


  i386 Intel Platform:

  SuSE-7.2
    
      7c84f6c3f8aaf2b96a312fea4d36abce
  source rpm:
    
      56ad3d7f883a3e3eb5e96c5a92f7a2e2

  SuSE-7.1
    
      cd7cedc70d56df239db8e4434344a46e
  source rpm:
    
      7a0ca55c351b81756a05dfcff4e062be


  Sparc Platform:

  SuSE-7.1
    
      bdb772783eedc1fb235e2ff0af5517f7
  source rpm:
    
      a5b625c3b0820f4715aeee18d20a9306


  AXP Alpha Platform:

  SuSE-7.1
    
      3958307564b855c81e556b4c7e01c105
  source rpm:
    
      143386a82750af64aec0f615fc847ab2


  PPC Power PC Platform:

  SuSE-7.1
    
      97e4ab067fc16b36ecdd5bc8915379ef
  source rpm:
    
      aa2f5914d8e00ef511081096a1c33671


______________________________________________________________________________

2)  Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds:


______________________________________________________________________________

3)  standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information

  - Package authenticity verification:

    SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
    the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
    to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
    sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
    the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
    independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
    file or rpm package:
    1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
    2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.

    1) execute the command
        md5sum 
       after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors.
       Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
       announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
       cryptographically signed (usually using the key security@suse.de),
       the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
       We advise against subscribing to lists which cause the
       email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
       the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
       list software.
       Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
       announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
       and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
       md5 sums for the files are useless.

    2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
       of an rpm package. Use the command
        rpm -v --checksig 
       to verify the signature of the package, where  is the
       filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
       package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm
       package file.
       Prerequisites:
        a) gpg is installed
        b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
           key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
           ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
           signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
           that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving
           this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
           running the command (do "su -" to be root):
            gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
           SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
           key "build@suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
           the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
           is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
           and at   .


  - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
    subscribe:

    suse-security@suse.com
        -   general/linux/SuSE security discussion.
            All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to
                <suse-security-subscribe@suse.com>.

    suse-security-announce@suse.com
        -   SuSE's announce-only mailing list.
            Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to
                <suse-security-announce-subscribe@suse.com>.

    For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
    send mail to:
        <suse-security-info@suse.com> or
        <suse-security-faq@suse.com> respectively.

    ==================================================    SuSE's security contact is <security@suse.com>.
    The <security@suse.com> public key is listed below.
    ==================================================______________________________________________________________________________

    The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
    provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
    it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the
    authenticity of the text.
    SuSE GmbH makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
    to the information contained in this security advisory.

SuSE: 'apache-contrib' mod_auth_mysql authentication bypass vulnerability

September 10, 2001
An adversary could insert MySQL commands along with a password and these commands will be interpreted by MySQL while mod_auth_mysql is doing the password lookup in the database

Summary


______________________________________________________________________________

                        SuSE Security Announcement

        Package:                apache-contrib
        Announcement-ID:        SuSE-SA:2001:31
        Date:                   Monday, September 10th 2001 12:30 MEST
        Affected SuSE versions: 7.1, 7.2
        Vulnerability Type:     authentication bypass
        Severity (1-10):        3
        SuSE default package:   no
        Other affected systems: yes

        Content of this advisory:
        1) security vulnerability resolved:  mod_auth_mysql
           problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information
        2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds
        3) standard appendix (further information)

______________________________________________________________________________

1)  problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information

  The Apache module mod_auth_mysql 1.4,which is shipped since SuSE Linux 7.1,
  was found vulnerable to possible bypass authentication by MySQL command
  injection.
  An adversary could insert MySQL commands along with a password and these
  commands will be interpreted by MySQL while mod_auth_mysql is doing the
  password lookup in the database. A positive authentication could be returned.

  Note, that this bug has not yet been proven exploitable so far.

  A temporary fix does not exist; we recommend to update your system with the
  new RPM from our FTP server.

  Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its
  integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement.
  Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Uhv file.rpm" to apply
  the update.

  After installing the updated RPM run
    - rcapache restart
    - SuSEconfig


  i386 Intel Platform:

  SuSE-7.2
    
      7c84f6c3f8aaf2b96a312fea4d36abce
  source rpm:
    
      56ad3d7f883a3e3eb5e96c5a92f7a2e2

  SuSE-7.1
    
      cd7cedc70d56df239db8e4434344a46e
  source rpm:
    
      7a0ca55c351b81756a05dfcff4e062be


  Sparc Platform:

  SuSE-7.1
    
      bdb772783eedc1fb235e2ff0af5517f7
  source rpm:
    
      a5b625c3b0820f4715aeee18d20a9306


  AXP Alpha Platform:

  SuSE-7.1
    
      3958307564b855c81e556b4c7e01c105
  source rpm:
    
      143386a82750af64aec0f615fc847ab2


  PPC Power PC Platform:

  SuSE-7.1
    
      97e4ab067fc16b36ecdd5bc8915379ef
  source rpm:
    
      aa2f5914d8e00ef511081096a1c33671


______________________________________________________________________________

2)  Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds:


______________________________________________________________________________

3)  standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information

  - Package authenticity verification:

    SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
    the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
    to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
    sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
    the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
    independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
    file or rpm package:
    1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
    2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.

    1) execute the command
        md5sum 
       after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors.
       Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
       announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
       cryptographically signed (usually using the key security@suse.de),
       the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
       We advise against subscribing to lists which cause the
       email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
       the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
       list software.
       Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
       announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
       and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
       md5 sums for the files are useless.

    2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
       of an rpm package. Use the command
        rpm -v --checksig 
       to verify the signature of the package, where  is the
       filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
       package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm
       package file.
       Prerequisites:
        a) gpg is installed
        b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
           key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
           ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
           signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
           that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving
           this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
           running the command (do "su -" to be root):
            gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
           SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
           key "build@suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
           the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
           is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
           and at   .


  - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
    subscribe:

    suse-security@suse.com
        -   general/linux/SuSE security discussion.
            All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to
                <suse-security-subscribe@suse.com>.

    suse-security-announce@suse.com
        -   SuSE's announce-only mailing list.
            Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to
                <suse-security-announce-subscribe@suse.com>.

    For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
    send mail to:
        <suse-security-info@suse.com> or
        <suse-security-faq@suse.com> respectively.

    ==================================================    SuSE's security contact is <security@suse.com>.
    The <security@suse.com> public key is listed below.
    ==================================================______________________________________________________________________________

    The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
    provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
    it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the
    authenticity of the text.
    SuSE GmbH makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
    to the information contained in this security advisory.

References

Severity

Related News